Abstract-In this paper we investigate the security properties of three versions of the WAI protocol in Chinese WLAN implementation plan. We first revisit the security analysis that has been done to the version 1 and 2. we show that the security proof given by Li, Moon, and Ma is incorrect and the alternative protocol EWAP of Zhang and Ma is not secure. We further analyse the third version of the WAI protocol and prove its security in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In addition, we also provide some practical security analysis of this version.
I. INTRODUCTION Key establishment plays a fundamental role in enabling other security services, such as symmetric encryption and message authentication. The modern study of key establishment protocols can be traced back to the seminal work of Needham and Schroeder [28] . After the invention of public key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman [19] , research into key establishment has grown rapidly, especially in the two-party setting, and a considerable number of protocols and security models have been proposed. Some of well known protocols include those in [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [19] ), however, we stress that it is impossible for us to enumerate all existing protocols. A number of key establishment protocols have been standardised by ISO [22] , [23] , [24] and IEEE [20] , [21] . Summaries of key establishment protocols can be found in [12] , [27] .
In the literature, researchers have attempted to analyse key establishment protocols using a number of analysis methods such as heuristic analysis, formal method, and complexity-theoretic method. The first complexity-theoretic security model for key establishment was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [6] . Later, this security model has been extended in a number of papers (e.g. [5] , [7] , [11] , [13] , [17] , [18] , [25] ). These security models use an indistinguishability-based approach to evaluate the session key security, where a key establishment protocol is said to achieve session key security if it is infeasible for any attacker to distinguish between the session key and a randomly chosen string. In contrast to the indistinguishability-based approach, the simulatability-based approach is also widely used in the literature (e.g. [5] , [29] , [17] ). When this approach is employed, an ideal functionality for key establishment is first defined, where the attacker's capabilities are highly restricted (compared with that in realworld), then a key establishment protocol is said to achieve session key security if it is infeasible to distinguish between an ideal-world execution of the protocol and a real-world execution, where the attacker's capabilities model the threats to key establishment protocols in practice.
The Canetti-Krawczyk model [17] is a well-known indistinguishability-based model for two-party key establishment protocols. In [17] a modular construction of key establishment protocols is also proposed and a simulatability-based approach is used to define the security of the construction.
A. Related work
Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) is the security mechanism in the Chinese Wireless LAN standard [1] . WAPI has two sub-modules: Wireless Authentication Infrastructure (WAI) and Wireless Privacy Infrastructure (WPI). The WAI protocol realise the functionality of authentication and key establishment between mobile Stations (STA) and Access Points (AP), while the WPI works on top of WAI to provide security guarantees for data communication. Until now, the WAI protocol has evolved through three different versions [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] .
Zhang and Ma [30] showed that the first version of the WAI protocol [1] is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. They also proposed a protocol EWAP as an alternative, which is claimed to be secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. Li, Moon, and Ma [26] claimed that the second version of the WAI protocol [3] is secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model.
In this paper, we show that the EWAP protocol does not guarantee key authentication and entity authentication properties, therefore, it is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model (and any other well-known security model for key establishment protocols). We shown that the second version of the WAI protocol is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model, which means that the security analysis of Li, Moon, and Ma is wrong.
B. Organisation
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II we review the second version of the WAI protocol and show that it is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In Section III we show the EWAP protocol proposed by Zhang and Ma suffers from serious attacks against key authentication and entity authentication properties. In Section IV, we review the third version of the WAI protocol and prove that it is secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In Section V we conclude the paper. to AP, where r, = Dec(cj,sksta), r2 CR {O,1}, ki1 k2 = Hi(ri D r2)', C2 = Enc(r2,pkap,e), and O2 = H2(k1, SPI c2). In addition, STA sets k1 as the session key. 8) After receiving (SPI, C2, 72), AP computes r2
Dec(c2, skap,e), computes kl, k2 in the same way as STA, and then checks O2. If the check succeeds, AP accepts k1 as the session key; otherwise, AP aborts.
The first five steps form the authentication sub-protocol, which enables STA and AP to authenticate each other. The final three steps form the key establishment sub-protocol, which enables STA and AP to establish a session key.
B. Security in the Canetti-Krawczyk model Li, Moon, and Ma [26] claimed that the second version of the WAI protocol is secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. However, we observe that, in their security analysis, neither the Canetti-Krawczyk model is well interpreted nor the security analysis is carried out with a rigorous security reduction. We show below, the WAI protocol is not secure in the CanettiKrawczyk model. 1) Review of the Canetti-Krawczyk model: In the CanettiKrawczyk model [17] , security is defined for key exchange protocols in the Authenticated Model (AM) and the Unauthenticated Model (UM), respectively. In the AM, protocol messages are faithfully delivered by the attacker, while in the UM the attacker can manipulate the messages. In addition, a modular approach is proposed to transform a protocol secure in the AM into a protocol secure in the UM. We briefly introduce the security definitions in the UM, and omit other details of the Canetti-Krawczyk model.
Let the user set be Ui (1 < 2) The partner oracle of j7jsidi has not been issued a i,j session-state-reveal, session-key reveal;
3) Ui has not been issued a corrupt query, and Uj has not been issued a corrupt query beforing the partner oracle of rjsidi is issued a session-expiration query. possesses a key pair (pk5ta, sk5ta) for (Gen, Enc, Dec).
2) In a subsequent session for AP' and STA with identifier SPI' (where the attacker impersonates AP'), in step 6 the attacker sends cl cl and or/ Sign(SPI'l Icl, sklp,s) to STA. It is straightward to verify that STA will succeed in verifying the attacker's message. The attacker then corrupts STA's session through a session-state-reveal query and obtains r1. 3) In another subsequent session for AP and STA' with identifier SPI" (where this time the attacker impersonates STA'), after receiving cll = Enc(r/'; pkap,e) and (7// = Sign(SPI"Icl C skap,s) from AP in step 7, the attacker sends CII = C2 and or" to AP, where or" is randomly chosen from the appropriate domain. The attacker then corrupts AP's session through a session-state-reveal query and obtains r2. 4) With r1 and r2, the attacker can compute the session key belonging to the session identified by SPI. It is straightforward to verify that the attacker has played a valid game for session key security in the Canetti-Krawczyk model, which implies that the WAI protocol is not secure in this model.
C. Further Security Analysis
In addition to the above result, we have the following comments on the WAI protocol.
As noted by Li, Moon and Ma [26] , the protocol does not achieve perfect forward secrecy. This is because, given the private keys of both AP and STA, an attacker can recompute any previous established session keys from intercepted protocol messages. However, the situation is actually worse than this. In certain circumstances, as described below, if [30] showed that the first version of the WAI protocol [1] is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model, and proposed an alternative, namely the EWAP protocol. They claimed that the EWAP protocol is secure in the CanettiKrawczyk model. However, we show that their protocol is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model (and any other wellknown security model).
A. Description of the EWAP protocol
The system chooses two primes p, q satisfying q p -1, and a generator g of a multiplicative group of order q in E*, and a MAC function MAC. Let Alice and Bob be two users which possess identity IDa and IDb, respectively. Bob possesses a verify/sign key pair (pkb, skb) for a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, Verify).
If Alice and Bob wish to establish a shared secret key in a session identified by sid, then they perform as follows: 
B. Analysis of the EWAP Protocol
Zhang and Ma [30] claimed that the EWAP protocol is secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model based on the DDH assumption, given that the signature scheme is secure against chosen message attacks and the MAC function is secure. However, as we show below, the protocol is not secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model, and in fact, it achieves neither key authentication nor entity authentication. The attack is shown in the Figure 2 .
At the end of the attack, the attacker succeeds in impersonating Alice and obtains the session key possessed by Bob, therefore, the protocol does not achieve key authentication and entity authentication. In fact, this attack is due to the lack of authentication of messages from Alice and the improper use of the session key.
IV. THE THIRD VERSION OF THE WAI PROTOCOL
A. Description of the protocol As in the second version, three types of entities are involved in the WAI protocol: ASU, AP, and STA. ASU generates a verify/sign key pair (pkasu, skasu) for a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, Verify). STA and AP possess the public/private key pair (pksta, sksta) and (pkap, skap) for the same signature scheme, respectively. Let G, be a additive group of prime order p based on an elliptic curve and P is a generator of (G. In addition, the system has two hash function H1 {0, 1}* {0, 1}256 and H2: {, 1} -* ){o, if256.
The protocol may work in two modes: one is security association establishment mode and the other is base key update mode. We first describe the security association establishment mode.
When STA and AP wish to authenticate each other and establish a shared secret base key, they perform as follows: 1) AP sends an authentication request m1 to STA, where ml = (flag,, Aid, 0IDasu, Certap, param), param is a description of ((G,p, P), flag, is a 8-bit string, and Aid is an authentication identifier. The first bit of f lag, is set to be 0, and Aid is randomly chosen. is non-negligible then C's advantage is non-negligible. As a result, the theorem gets proved.
Remark: We have shown that the protocol is secure based on CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Alternatively, we can also prove the security based on Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption without random oracle model. Because of space limit, we omit the detailed proof.
We note that the authentication identifier Aid is stored as an local state, therefore, it is also secret information to an attacker in the base key update phase. When the protocol execution is run in the base key update mode, STA will reject any message from AP if Aid is different from that in its local storage. In practice, Aseed may plays an important role in preventing DoS attacks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that the security proof of Li, Moon, and Ma for the second version of the WAI protocol is incorrect and the alternative protocol EWAP of Zhang and Ma is not secure. We have also proved that the third version of the WAI protocol is secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model.
